Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions; one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true Π n -sentences or equivalently the Σ n -soundness of the theory, and the other is n-consistency the restriction of ω-consistency to the Σ n -formulas. It is also shown that Rosser's Incompleteness Theorem does not generally hold for definable non-recursively enumerable theories; whence Gödel-Rosser's Incompleteness Theorem is optimal in a sense. Though the proof of the incompleteness theorem using the Σ n -soundness assumption is constructive, it is shown that there is no constructive proof for the incompleteness theorem using the n-consistency assumption, for n > 2.
Introduction and Preliminaries
Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem is usually taken to be the incompleteness of the first order theory of Peano Arithmetic PA. While PA is not a complete theory, the theorem states much more than that. One of the most misleading ways for stating the theorem is: any sound theory containing PA is incomplete, where a theory is called sound when all its axioms are true in the standard model of natural numbers N. A quick counterexample for this statement, often asked by new learners of the incompleteness, is that but the theory of true arithmetic Th(N) is complete?!, where Th(N) is the set of sentences that are true in the standard model of natural numbers. Of course, the obvious answer is that Th(N) is not recursively enumerable (re for short). So, the right rewording of Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem in its (weaker) semantic form is that any sound and re theory containing PA is incomplete. Now, a natural second question is: what about non-re theories (that are sound and contain PA)? Again the same obvious answer shows up: Th(N) is not re (by the very theorem of Gödel's first incompleteness) and is complete. So, the question of the incompleteness of non-re theories should come down to more specific ones, at least to finitely representable theories, or, as the logicians say, definable ones. Hence, do we have the incompleteness of definable theories (which are sound and contain PA)? This question has been answered affirmatively in the literature; see e.g. [15] or [12] . Gödel's original first incompleteness theorem did not assume the soundness of the theory in question, and he used the notion of ω-consistency for that purpose. Later it was found out that the weaker notion of 1-consistency suffices for the theorem (see e.g. [3] or [13] ). By generalizing this equivalent notion to higher degrees (Π n in general) we will prove some generalizations of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem for definable theories below. Finally, Rosser's Trick proves Gödel's result without assuming the 1-consistency of the theory. So, Gödel-Rosser's Incompleteness Theorem, assuming only the consistency of the theory, states that any consistent and re theory containing PA is incomplete. It is tempting to weaken the condition of recursive enumerability of the theory in this theorem; but we will see below that this is not possible. We can thus argue that Gödel-Rosser's theorem is optimal in a sense.
Some Notation and Conventions
We fix the following notation and conventions (mostly from [2, 3, 6, 13, 15] ). Fix a language of arithmetic, like {0, S, +, ×, } (as in [2] ) or {0, 1, +, ×, <} (as in [6] ).
• For any natural number n ∈ N the term n represents this number in the fixed arithmetical language (which could be S · · · S(0) or 1 + · · · + 1 [n-times]). For a fixed Gödel numbering of syntax, α denotes the Gödel number of the object α; when there is no ambiguity we will write simply α for the term α . Any Gödel numbering consists of coding sequences; if m is the code of a sequence, then the formula Seq(m) expresses this fact, and its length is denoted by en(m) and for any number • The classes of formulas {Σ n } n∈N and {Π n } n∈N are defined in the standard way [2, 6] : Σ 0 = Π 0 is the class of bounded formulas (in which every universal quantifier has the form ∀x([x t → · · · ] and every existential quantifier has the form ∃x[x t∧· · · ]), and the class Σ n+1 contains the closure of Π n
• A definable theory is the set of all logical consequences of a set of sentences that (the set of the Gödel numbers of its members) is definable by an arithmetical formula Axioms T (x) [meaning that x is the Gödel number of an axiom of T ]. The formula ConjAx T (x) states that "x is the Gödel code of a formula which is a conjunction of some axioms of T ", i.e., x = i=1 ϕ i where i=1 Axioms T ( ϕ i ). The proof predicate of first order logic is denoted by Proof(y, x) which is a Σ 0 -formula stating that "y is the code of a proof of the formula with code x in the first order logic". So, for a definable theory T the provability predicate of T is the formula Prov T (x) = ∃y, z ConjAx T (z) ∧ Proof(y, z → x) ; also the consistency predicate of T is Con(T ) = ¬Prov T ( 0 = 0 ). Let us note that Prov T defines the set of T -provable formulas, the deductive closure of (the axioms of) T . For a class of formulas Γ the theory T is called Γ-definable when Axioms T ∈ Γ. Let us also note that if Axioms T ∈ Σ n+1 or Axioms T ∈ Π n then ConjAx T ∈ Σ n+1 or ConjAx T ∈ Π n , respectively, and so in either case Prov T ∈ Σ n+1 .
• Theory T decides the sentence ϕ when either T ϕ or T ¬ϕ. A theory is called complete when it can decide every sentence in its language. A theory T is called Γ-deciding when it can decide any sentence in Γ. In the literature, a theory T is called Γ-complete when for any sentence ϕ ∈ Γ, if N |= ϕ then T ϕ. Note that if a sound theory is Γ-deciding then it is Γ-complete. A theory T is called ω-consistent when for no formula ϕ both the conditions (i) T ¬ϕ(n) for all n ∈ N, and (ii) T ∃xϕ(x) hold together. It is called n-consistent when for no formula ϕ ∈ Σ n with ϕ = ∃xψ(x) and ψ ∈ Π n−1 one has (i) T ¬ψ(n) for all n ∈ N, and (ii) T ϕ. Theory T is called Γ-Sound, when for any sentence ϕ ∈ Γ, if T ϕ then N |= ϕ. For example, any consistent theory containing Π n -Th(N) is Σ n -sound. Let us note that, since Th(N) is a complete and thus a maximally consistent theory, the soundness of T is equivalent to Th(N) ⊆ T and to the consistency of T + Th(N). In general, for any consistent extension T of Q, the Σ n -soundness of T is equivalent to the consistency of T + Π n -Th(N) (cf. Theorems 26,31 of [3] ). Also, for any T ⊇ Q, since Q is a Σ 1 -complete theory, the consistency of T is equivalent to the consistency of T + Π 0 -Th(N), i.e. Con T + Π 0 -Th(N) , which, in turn, is equivalent to the Σ 0 -soundness of T (cf. Theorem 5 of [3] ).
Semantic Condition
Conventional Notation Syntactic Condition
Some Earlier Attempts and Results
By Gödel's incompleteness theorem, PA (and every re extension of it) is not Π 1 -complete; then what about S = PA + Π 1 -Th(N)? Is this theory complete? For sure, it is Π 1 -complete and Σ 1 -complete; but can it be, say, Π 2 -complete? Let us note that S is a Π 1 -definable theory; i.e. Axioms S ∈ Π 1 , and so Prov S ∈ Σ 2 . So, it is natural to ask if the incompleteness phenomena still hold for definable arithmetical theories.
Results of Jeroslow (1975)
Jeroslow [5] showed in 1975 that when the set of theorems of a consistent theory that contains PA is ∆ 2 -definable, then it cannot contain the set of all true Π 1 -sentences.
Jeroslow (1975) :
This result casts a new light on a classical theorem on the existence of a ∆ 2 -definable complete extension of PA (see [14] ): no such complete extension can contain all the true Π 1 -sentences. Note that one cannot weaken the assumption Prov T ∈ ∆ 2 in the theorem, to, say, Prov T ∈ Σ 2 because e.g. for the theory S above we have Prov S ∈ Σ 2 and Π 1 -Th(N) ⊆ S.
Results of Hájek (1977)
Jeroslow's theorem was generalized by Hájek ([1] ) who showed that when the set of theorems of a consistent theory that contains PA is ∆ n -definable, then it cannot be Π n−1 -complete:
Another result of Hájek ( [1] ) is that if a deductively closed extension of PA is Π n -definable and n-consistent, then it cannot be Π n−1 -complete:
He also showed that no such theory can be complete; i.e., when
Here, we generalize this theorem by showing the existence of an independent Π n−1 -sentence: an n-consistent theory T is assumed to contain Peano Arithmetic (and be closed under deduction) and its set of theorems is assumed to be Π n -definable for some n 2. Then it is shown that (1) Π n−1 -Th(N) ⊆ T , and a proof is presented for the fact that (2) T is incomplete.
In the proof of (1) for the sake of contradiction it is assumed that Π n−2 -Th(N) ⊆ T ; and at the end of the proof of (2) the inconsistency of T has been inferred from the T -provability of a false Π n−2 -sentence (denoted by τ 1 (p, m, ϕ) in [1] ). Of course, when Π n−2 -Th(N) ⊆ T then no false Π n−2 -sentence is provable in T . Probably, the proof did not intend to make use of the (wrong) assumption (of Π n−2 -Th(N) ⊆ T ); rather the intention could have been using the completeness and n-consistency of T to show that T cannot prove any false Π n−2 -sentence. This is the subject of the next lemma ( 
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The following lemma generalizes Theorem 20 of [3] which states that the true arithmetic Th(N) is the only ω-consistent extension of PA (indeed Q) that is complete.
Lemma 1.2 (A Gap in the Proof of Theorem 2.5(2) in [1])
Any n-consistent and Π n -deciding extension of Q is Π n -complete.
Proof. By induction on n. For n = 0 there is nothing to prove. If the theorem holds for n then we prove it for n + 1 as follows. If T is (n + 1)-consistent and Π n+1 -deciding, but not Π n+1 -complete, there must exist some ψ ∈ Π n+1 -Th(N) such that T ψ. Write ψ = ∀zη(z) for some η ∈ Σ n ; then N |= η(m) for any m ∈ N. By the induction hypothesis, T is Π n -complete and so Σ n -complete; thus T η(m) for all m ∈ N. On the other hand since T is Π n+1 -deciding and T ψ we must have T ¬ψ, thus T ∃z¬η(z). This contradicts the (n + 1)-consistency of T . J Corollary 1.3 (Generalizing Theorem 2.5(2) of [1] ) If the deductive closure of an n-consistent extension of PA is Π n -definable, then it has an independent Π n−1 -sentence (for any n 2).
Proof. If for a theory T we have PA ⊆ T and Prov T ∈ Π n and n-Con(T ) then it cannot be Π n−1 -deciding, since otherwise by Lemma 1.2 (and (n − 1)-consistency of T ), Π n−1 -Th(N) ⊆ T ; this is in contradiction with Theorem 2.5(1) of [1] which states that Π n−1 -Th(N) ⊆ T under the above assumptions. J Below we will give yet another generalization of the above corollary (and a result of [1] ) in Corollary 2.6. Hájek [1] has also showed that if the set of axioms of a consistent theory is Π 1 -definable and that theory contains PA and all the true Π 1 -sentences, then it is not Π 2 -deciding. In Corollary 2.5 we will generalize this result by showing that no consistent Π n -definable and Π n -complete extension of Q is Π n+1 -deciding.
Some Recent Attempts
In the result of Jeroslow (Theorem 2 of [5] ) and Hájek's generalizations (Theorem 2.5(1) and Theorem 2.8 of [1] ) there is no incompleteness; we have only some non-inclusion (of the set of true Π 1 or Π n sentences in the theory). In the incompleteness theorems of Hájek ([1] and Corollaries 1.3 and 2.5) we had the, somewhat strong, assumptions of n-consistency or Π n -completeness (with consistency). It is natural to ask if we can weaken these assumptions (like in Rosser's Trick) to mere consistency; and some attempts [7, 4] have been made in this direction. Let us note that Rosserian (also Gödelean) proofs make sense for definable theories only (for example the undefinable theory Th(N) is complete) for the reason that when a theory T is definable one can construct its provability predicate Prov T , and once one has a provability predicate for T then it becomes a definable theory. We note that the proofs of Gödel-Rosser's incompleteness theorem for non-re theories given in [7, 4] are both wrong; for the falsity of the argument of [7] one can see [10] ; cf. also [8] and [11] . The falsity of the proof of [4] is shown in the following remark (1.4). Unfortunately, there is no hope of extending Gödel-Rosser's incompleteness theorem to definable theories, even to Π 1 -definable ones; our Corollary 3.4 below shows that even a (consistent and) Π 1 -definable theory (extending Q) can be complete. This clashes all the hopes for a general incompleteness phenomenon in the class of definable, and consistent, theories. 
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Gödel-Rosser's Incompleteness Theorems for non-re Theories Π 1 -definable consistent extension of Q there existed a Σ 1 -sentence A independent from it, then the theory Q + Π 1 -Th(N) would have had a Π 1 -sentence independent from it. But it is well-known that this theory is Σ 1 -complete and Π 1 -complete. So, the proof of the main theorem of [4] is flawed. In fact, the mistaken step is in the proof of Lemma 2 where the author claims that "m 1 can be chosen such that m 2 m 1 and hence R(k, m 2 , Neg(n))." But if we choose m 1 arbitrarily large then the condition ∀x m 1 R k, x, Neg(n) may not necessarily hold anymore. Indeed, Theorem 3.1 for n = 0 is the negation of what is claimed in the Abstract of [4] . " 2 Gödel's Theorem Generalized
Semantic Form of Gödel's Theorem
Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem in its (weaker) semantic form states that no sound and re extension of Q can be Π 1 -complete. Noting that a set is re if and only if it is Σ 1 -definable, this theorem can be depicted as:
A natural generalization of this theorem is the following (cf. Chapter III of [15] , or Corollary 1 of [12] ):
Theorem 2.1 No sound and Σ n -definable (n > 0) extension of Q can be Π n -complete.
Proof. Suppose T is a sound extension of Q such that Axioms T ∈ Σ n . By Diagonal Lemma (see e.g. [2, 13] ) there exists a sentence γ such that Q γ ←→ ¬Prov T ( γ ). Obviously, γ ∈ Π n . We show that ( †) N |= γ. Since, otherwise (if N |= ¬γ then) there must exist some k, m ∈ N such that N |= ConjAx T (k) and N |= Proof(m, k → γ ). Whence, T γ which contradicts the soundness of T . So, N |= γ. Now, we show that T γ. For the sake of contradiction, assume T γ. Then, by the compactness theorem, there are some
If m is the code of this proof and k is the code of
No sound and Π n -definable extension of Q can be Π n+1 -complete.
Corollary 2.2 :
Proof. It suffices to note that any Π n -definable is also Σ n+1 -definable. J Remark 2.3 It is well known that Q is Σ 1 -complete (see e.g. [2, 6, 13] ) but not Π 1 -complete (by Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, see e.g. [2, 6, 13] ). So, Σ 1 -completeness does not imply Π 1 -completeness, and in general, Σ n -completeness does not imply Π n -completeness, since for example the Σ n -complete and sound theory Q + Σ n -Th(N) is not Π n -complete by Theorem 2.1. On the other hand, Π n -completeness (of any theory T ) implies (its) Σ n -completeness, even (its) Σ n+1 -completeness: for any true Σ n+1 -sentence ∃x 1 , . . . , x k θ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) with θ ∈ Π n there are n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N such that N |= θ(n 1 , . . . , n k ), and so by Π n -completeness of T we have T θ(n 1 , . . . , n k ) whence T ∃x 1 , . . . , x k θ(x 1 , . . . , x k ). In symbols:
Sα ∂Sα ı ir
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General Form of Gödel's Theorem
The original form of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem states that a recursively enumerable extension of Q which is ω-consistent cannot be Π 1 -deciding. This syntactic notion was introduced to take place of the semantic notion of soundness. Later it was found out that Gödel's proof works with the weaker assumption of 1-consistency which is equivalent to the consistency (of the theory) with Π 1 -Th(N) (see [3] ):
A natural generalization of the theorem in this form is the Π n -undecidability of any Σ n -definable extension of Q which is consistent with Π n -Th(N); proved in Corollary 2.8 of the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4
No Π n -definable extension of Q can be Π n+1 -deciding if it is consistent with Π n -Th(N).
Theorem 2.4 :
Proof. By Diagonal Lemma there exists a sentence γ such that
where, −, − is an injective pairing (such as u,
γ then there are ψ ∈ Π n -Th(N) (note that Π n -Th(N) is closed under conjunction) and a conjunction ϕ of the axioms of T such that ψ ∧ ϕ → γ. Let m be the Gödel code of this proof and let k = ψ , ϕ . Now, we have N |= Ψ(k, m), and so by the Π n -completeness of T * we have T * Ψ(k, m), thus by ( ), T * ∃u k∃z m Ψ(u , z ).
( ‡)
On the other hand by the consistency of T * we have T * ¬γ. So, for any q = q 1 , q 2 , r ∈ N we have that if N |= Π n -True(q 1 ) ∧ ConjAx T (q 2 ) then N |= ¬Proof(r, q 1 ∧q 2 → ¬γ ). Whence, N |= ¬ Ψ(q, r) holds for all q, r ∈ N in particular for all q k, r m; thus N |= ∀u k∀z m¬ Ψ(u , z ). Now, ∀u k∀z m¬ Ψ(u , z ) is a true Σ n -sentence and T * is a Π n -complete theory; so by Remark 2.3, 
Below, we will show that (ii) T * ∀u, z ¬Ψ(u, z) ∨ ∃u u∃z z Ψ(u , z ) , which contradicts (i) above. The proof of (ii) will be in three steps:
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is true. Then, by the consistency of T * we have T * γ and so for all p ∈ N we have N |= ¬Proof(p, i 1 ∧ i 2 → γ ). Whence, T * proves the true Π 1 -sentence ∀z¬Proof(z, i 1 ∧i 2 → γ ), and so T * ∀z¬Ψ(i, z).
(3) Again we need to show T * ∀u ¬Ψ(u, j) for all j < m. Since T * proves the true Π 1 -sentence ∀x, y, v, w Proof(w, x ∧ y → v) → x, y < w then T Gödel-Rosser (1936) :
In the light of our above mentioned results it is natural to expect a generalization of this theorem to higher levels (to Σ n or Π n definable theories); alas (by the following theorem for n = 0) there can bo no such generalization for Rosser's Theorem.
Theorem 3.1 There exists a complete (and consistent) and Σ n+2 -definable extension of Q + Π n -Th(N).
Proof. That there exists a complete Σ 2 -definable extension of Q is almost a classical fact; see [14] . Here, we generalize this result to Q + Π n -Th(N). Let the theory S be Q when n = 0 and be Q + Π n -Th(N) when n > 0 (note that Π 0 -Th(N) ⊆ Q). Theory S can be completed by Lindenbaum's Lemma as follows: for an enumeration of all the sentences ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , · · · take T 0 = S, and let T n+1 = T n + ϕ n if Con(T n + ϕ n ) and let T n+1 = T n + ¬ϕ otherwise [if ¬Con(T n + ϕ n )]. Then the theory T * = n∈N T n is a complete extension of S; below we show the Σ n+2 -definability of T
* . An enumeration of all the sentences can be defined by a Σ 0 -formula such as the following expression for "x is the (Gödel number of the) u th sentence":
Now, Axioms T * (x) can be defined by the following formula:
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which is Σ n+2 because the following formula (where q is the Gödel code of the conjunction of all the [finitely many] axioms of Q and ⊥ = [0 = 0])
if n > 0 is Π n+1 since Π n -True ∈ Π n (and ConjSeq, Proof ∈ Π 0 ). J
Comparing Σ n -Soundness with n-Consistency
The assumptions on the theory T used in Corollaries 2.8 and 2.10, other than Q ⊆ T &Axioms T ∈ Σ n , are either consistency with the set of all true Π n sentences (or equivalently, Σ n -soundness) or n-consistency of T (cf. also Corollaries 2.9 and 2.11). So, it is desirable to compare the assumptions of Σ n -soundness and n-consistency used in these results.
Proposition 3.2 (1)
If a theory is Σ n -sound, then it is n-consistent.
(2) If a Σ n−1 -complete theory is n-consistent, then it is Σ n -sound.
Proof.
(1) Assume T ∃xψ(x) for some Σ n -sound theory T and some formula ψ ∈ Π n−1 . By the Σ nsoundness of T , N |= ∃xψ(x), and so N |= ψ(m) for some m ∈ N. Now, ψ(m) ∈ Π n−1 -Th(N), and again by the Σ n -soundness of T we have T ¬ψ(m).
(2) Assume T ∃xψ(x) for some Σ n−1 -complete and n-consistent theory T and some formula ψ ∈ Π n−1 . By n-consistency, there exists some m ∈ N such that T ¬ψ(m). By Σ n−1 -completeness, N |= ¬ψ(m); and so N |= ψ(m), whence N |= ∃xψ(x). J Remark 3.3 In fact, for n = 0, 1, 2 the notions of Σ n -soundness and n-consistency are equivalent for Σ 1 -complete theories (see Theorems 5,25,30 of [3] ); but for n 3, n-consistency does not imply Σ n -soundness. Even, ω-consistency does not imply Σ 3 -soundness (see Theorem 19 of [3] proved by Kreisel in 1955). Generally, Σ n -soundness does not imply (n + 1)-consistency: Let γ be the true Π n+1 -sentence constructed in Theorem 2.4 for the theory Q + Π n -Th(N) and put S = T + ¬γ. Now, S is Σ n -sound and not (n + 1)-consistent, since for ¬γ = ∃xδ(x) ∈ Σ n+1 we have S ∃xδ(x) and for any k ∈ N we have S ¬δ(k) since S is Σ n+1 -complete by Remark 2.3 and ¬δ(k) ∈ Σ n+1 -Th(N) (because, if N |= ¬δ(k) then N |= δ(k) and so N |= ¬γ contradiction!). "
Corollary 3.4 (1) There exists a complete extension of Q which is Σ n+2 -definable and consistent with Π n -Th(N) (and so n-consistent).
(2) There exists a complete extension of Q which is Π n+1 -definable and consistent with Π n -Th(N) (and so n-consistent).
Summing up, Gödel first incompleteness theorem in its semantic form, which states the Π 1 -incompleteness of any sound and Σ 1 -definable extension of Q, can be generalized to show that any sound and Σ n -definable extension of Q is Π n -incomplete. Also, Gödel's original first incompleteness theorem, which is equivalent to the Π 1 -undecidability of any Σ 1 -sound and Σ 1 -definable extension of Q, can be generalized to show that no Σ n -sound and Σ n -definable extension of Q is Π n -deciding (here actually Σ n−1 -soundness suffices by Rosser's Trick). Finally, Rosser's incompleteness theorem, which states the Π 1 -undecidability of any consistent and Σ 1 -definable extension of Q, cannot be generalized to definable theories, not even to Π 1 -definable ones. Concluding, we have the following table for n > 1 which shows our results in a viewable perspective: 
